Base Library

ntroduction
The Condorcet Efficiency of Voting Rules and Related Paradoxes
Analyzing the Probability of Election Outcomes with Abstentions
Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention
The Effect of Closeness on the Election of a Pairwise Majority Rule Winner
Analyzing the Practical Relevance of the Condorcet Loser Paradox and the Agenda Contraction Paradox
Other Voting Paradoxes
On the Probability of the Ostrogorski Paradox
Violations of Reversal Symmetry Under Simple and Runoff Scoring Rules
Binary Voting in Federations
Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union
“One Man, One Vote” Part 1: Electoral Justice in the U.S. Electoral College: Banzhaf and Shapley/Shubik Versus May
Resistance to Manipulations
Further Results on the Manipulability of Social Choice Rules—A Comparison of Standard and Favardin–Lepelley Types of Individual Manipulation
Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions
Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems
Game Theory
Dummy Players and the Quota in Weighted Voting Games: Some Further Results
Who Wins and Loses Under Approval Voting? An Analysis of Large Elections
Techniques for Probability Computations
Combinatorics of Election Scores
From Gehrlein-Fishburn’s Method on Frequency Representation to a Direct Proof of Ehrhart’s extended Conjecture
IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report